

François Morellet
Random Distribution of 40,000 Squares using the Odd and Even Numbers of a Telephone Directory 1960

ATTRACT

In-Silico generation of random bit streams

RANDOM POWER

the value of unpredictability

Massimo Caccia
Università dell'Insubria & Random Power s.r.l.
massimo.caccia@randompower.eu

TIPP 2023
Cape Town, South Africa, Sept. 6

RANDOM POWER



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
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

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RANDOM POWER


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
1 1 0 1 0

FALLING WALLS VENTURE



RANDOM POWER

WHAT FOR?

Unpredictability to preserve the predictability of our clockwork world

- the **RSA** (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) public key cryptography protocol uses two random prime numbers of length up to 2048 bits to generate the keys

1. introduction:

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

https://xkcd.com; Randall Munroe

1. introduction:

WHAT FOR?

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- **Image encryption** is also relying on random single-bit arrays:



B. Murugan et al., A hybrid image encryption algorithm using chaos and Conway's game-of-life cellular automata, Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:634–651, DOI: 10.1002/sec.1386

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



B. Murugan et al., A hybrid image encryption algorithm using chaos and Conway's game-of-life cellular automata, Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:634–651, DOI: 10.1002/sec.1386

WHAT FOR?

there is definitely a hype about Random bit streams, not only for crypto but also for gaming, virtual reality , Monte Carlo simulations, IoT, Satellite communication & control and notably Privacy Preservation Procedures

"Differential privacy makes it possible for tech companies to collect and share aggregate information about user habits, while maintaining the privacy of individual users."

▶ a 2020 paper by the U.S. Census Bureau:

Randomness Concerns When Deploying Differential Privacy

Simson L. Garfinkel
US Census Bureau
Suitland, MD
simson.l.garfinkel@census.gov

Philip Leclerc
US Census Bureau
Suitland, MD
philip.leclerc@census.gov

true data. Thus, while the data for the Decennial Census can be stored in a few tens of gigabytes, protecting its output statistics will require the DAS to use roughly 90TB of random data.

▶ a 2023 article on FORBES:

Challenges Of Zero-Knowledge Proof Technology For Compliance

F **Alexander Ray** Forbes Councils Member
Forbes Business Council COUNCIL POST | Membership (fee-based)

Problem 2: Vulnerability To Random Number Generator Attacks

2. market potential:





Total Market by Product Type

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Chips	1.2	48.5	159.2	455.6	1,038.7	1,771.4	2,688.8	3,672.1	4,877.9	6,544.5
Extension Cards	85.6	210.7	1,014.7	1,560.8	1,768.0	2,388.7	2,915.5	3,414.4	3,841.2	4,577.7
Standalone Devices	180.0	1,530.0	2,594.5	3,658.0	3,356.7	3,035.8	3,712.1	3,874.1	3,904.8	3,134.7
Total ($M)	**266.8**	**1,789.2**	**3,768.4**	**5,674.4**	**6,163.3**	**7,195.9**	**9,316.5**	**10,960.7**	**12,623.9**	**14,256.9**

INSIDE™ QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY

RANDOM POWER

HOW TO GENERATE AN UNPREDICTABLE RANDOM NUMBER?

It is always nice to consider an artist's point of view:

"With *Random Distribution*, the purpose of my system was to cause a reaction between two colours of equal intensity. **I drew horizontal and vertical lines to make 40,000 squares. Then my wife or my sons would read out the numbers from the phone book (except the first repetitive digits), and I would mark each square for an even number while leaving the odd ones blank.** The crossed squares were painted blue and the blank ones red. For the 1963 Paris Biennale I made a 3-D version of it that was shown among the Groupe de Recherche d'Art Visuel installations (and re-created it again on different occasions). I wanted to create a dazzling fight between two colours that shared the same luminosity. This balance of colour intensity was hard to adjust because daylight enhances the blue and artificial light boosts the red. I wanted the visitors to have a disturbing experience when they walked into this room – to almost hurt their eyes with the pulsating, flickering balance of two colours. I like that kind of aggression."

excerpt from https://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/articles/65-38-21-4-72



François Morellet (1926-2016)
Random Distribution of 40,000 Squares using the Odd and Even Numbers of a Telephone Directory 1960
MOMA, New York

RANDOM POWER

HOW TO GENERATE AN UNPREDICTABLE RANDOM NUMBER?

PRNG

(PseudoRandom Number Generators)

are essentially a piece of software code
⇒ they deterministic and in principle

predictable

$$x_n \equiv a x_{n-1} + b \ (mod \ m)$$

an example of linear congruential generator

J. Von Neumann: Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin.

Von Neumann, John (1951). "Various techniques used in connection with random digits" (PDF). *National Bureau of Standards Applied Mathematics Series*. **12**: 36–38.

http://glee.wikia.com/wiki/File:281735_1342370254-coin-flip.gif.gif

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TRNG
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RANDOM POWER

HOW TO GENERATE AN UNPREDICTABLE RANDOM NUMBER?

PRNG
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Fast, cheap & reasonably easy. However:

- software Random Number Generation is PSEUDO
- code can be bugged
- and it may have a BACKDOOR


Attack Trends
Editor: David Ahmad, drma@mac.com

Two Years of Broken Crypto

Debian's Dress Rehearsal

2006


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The New York Times — U.S.

Search All NYTimes.com — Go

WORLD | U.S. | N.Y. / REGION | BUSINESS | TECHNOLOGY | SCIENCE | HEALTH | SPORTS | OPINION | ARTS | STYLE | TRAVEL | JOBS | REAL ESTATE | AUTOS

POLITICS | EDUCATION | TEXAS

Secret Documents Reveal N.S.A. Campaign Against Encryption

Documents show that the N.S.A. has been waging a war against encryption using a battery of methods that include working with industry to weaken encryption standards, making design changes to cryptographic software, and pushing international encryption standards it knows it can break. Related Article »

Excerpt from 2013 Intelligence Budget Request | Bullrun Briefing Sheet

This excerpt from the N.S.A.'s 2013 budget request outlines the ways in which the agency circumvents the encryption protection of everyday Internet communications. The Sigint Enabling Project involves industry relationships, clandestine changes to commercial software to weaken encryption, and lobbying for encryption standards it can crack.

2013

TRNG
(True Random Number Generators)

Extracting bits from the observation of natural phenomena is not trivial and you may suffer from

- "coin bias" by the embodiment of a great principle
- weakness against environmental parameters
- a significant "attack surface", conditioning the device in use
- low bit rate

HOW DO WE DO IT?

Inspired by Forrest Gump, we say:

RADIOACTIVE IS AS RADIOACTIVE DOES

- emission by a radioactive source is due to the quantum laws of Nature
- decays of unstable nuclei are unpredictable

⇒ the sequence of detected decays can be used to generate random bits with different recipes:

- check the parity of the number of pulses in a time window
- pre-define the time window in a way that is equally like to have or not to have a single pulse



Sequence of pulses by the decay of a radioactive source in a nuclear physics detector

The idea behind RANDOM POWER is to replace a radioactive source with something safer, more handy, cost effective, simple, robust, providing sequences of pulses mimicking radioactive decays.

The generator, an array of Single Photon Avalanche Diodes, namely p-n junctions operated beyond the breakdown voltage:

A pioneering development by Prof. S. Cova at Politecnico di Milano

Cova, S., Ghioni, M., Lacaita, A. L., Samori, C., and Zappa, F. "Avalanche photodiodes and quenching circuits for single-photon detection", Applied Optics, 35(12), 1956—1976 (1996)

The essence of a cell



- Very shallow p-n junction → ~ 1 μm
- High electric field → > 3 x 10^5 V/cm
- Mean free path → ≈ 0.01 μm

Simulation of an avalanche development



Courtesy of Ivan Rech, Politecnico di Milano
[50 μm cell size]

Multiplication by about 1 000 000



E. Charbon & S. Donati, OPN Optics & Photonics News, February 2010

Photon induced charge carrier generation

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

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

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

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Photon induced charge carrier generation

Not indexed arrays of SPAD, with a single output node, are nowadays known as Silicon Photomultipliers, the state-of-the-art room T detectors with single photon sensitivity and photon-number resolving capability:



- SiPM may be seen as a collection of binary cells, fired when a photon in absorbed

[in principle, a NATIVE DIGITAL DEVICE]



- histogram of the response to a high statistics of low intensity light pulses

The name of the game: charge carriers can be generated “spontaneously”, also when no light is illuminating the sensor

A lesson from the past, when this was known since the early days of the Silicon technology development:

PHYSICAL REVIEW VOLUME 94, NUMBER 4 MAY 15, 1954

1

Avalanche Breakdown in Silicon

K. G. McKay
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey
(Received December 23, 1953)

JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHYSICS VOLUME 35, NUMBER 5 MAY 1964

2

Model for the Electrical Behavior of a Microplasma*

Roland H. Haitz†
Shockley Laboratory, Clevite Corporation Semiconductor Division, Palo Alto, California
(Received 5 November 1963)

The complex current fluctuations observed in connection with microplasma breakdown can be explained by a simple model containing two constants: extrapolated breakdown voltage V_b and series resistance R_s; and two continuous probability functions: turnoff probability per unit time $p_{10}(I)$ as a function of pulse current I and turn-on probability per unit time p_{01}. Experimental methods allowing an accurate measurement of these four quantities are described. The new concept of an extrapolated breakdown voltage V_b is discussed based on two independent measurements: one of secondary multiplication and the other of instantaneous current, both as a function of voltage. Within the experimental accuracy of 20 mV both methods extrapolated to one and the same breakdown voltage. The turnoff probability $p_{10}(I)$ is determined by a new combination of experimental techniques to cover the current range from 5 to 70 μA with a variation of 11 decades for $p_{10}(I)$. The observation of a narrow turnoff interval is explained quantitatively.

F APPLIED PHYSICS VOLUME 36, NUMBER 10 OCTOBER 1965

Mechanisms Contributing to the Noise Pulse Rate of Avalanche Diodes*

3

Roland H. Haitz†
Shockley Research Laboratory, Semiconductor Division of Clevite Corporation,‡ Palo Alto, California
(Received 16 November 1964)

1. INTRODUCTION

MOST reverse biased p–n junctions in silicon have their avalanche breakdown caused by microplasma effects. Microplasmas are small regions within the junction,[1] where a local disturbance of the electrical field is believed to reduce the breakdown voltage to a value below the breakdown voltage of the surrounding uniform junction.[2–5] As voltage is increased from low values microplasma breakdown is generally characterized by random “on–off” current fluctuations so long as currents remain below a critical value (40 to 120 μA).[6–8]

from paper 2



Fig. 5. Avalanche current as a function of time at low temperatures. The group character of the avalanche pulses is obvious.

from paper 3

RANDOM POWER

The name of the game: charge carriers can be generated "spontaneously", also when no light is illuminating the sensor, by quantum tunnelling



Fig. 8. Representation of the different sources of primary dark events and their location in the SPAD structure.

after A. Gola, C. Piemonte, NIM A926 (2019) 2-15

Thermal generation of carriers by states in the bang-gap (Shockley-Read-Hall statistics), where trapping and de-trapping is increased by the high electric field in the junction. The **Generation rate** can be written as:

$$G = \frac{n_i}{2 \cdot \cosh\left(\frac{E_0 - E_t}{kT}\right)} N_t \sigma v_{th} = \frac{n_i}{\tau_{g0}}$$

E_0 = Fermi level
E_t = trapping level
n_i = intrinsic carrier concentration
N_t = trapping concentration
σ = trapping cross section
v_{th} = thermal velocity

$$G = \frac{(1+\Gamma)\, n_i}{\tau_{g0}}$$

Γ "boost" by the field





F. Acerbi, et al., IEEE Trans. Electron Devices 64 (2) (2017) 521-526.

Key issues:

- **in SiPM, the Dark Count Rate is O(1 KHz)/cell, 50 μm pitch (it may be higher for SPAD arrays in CMOS technology)**
- provided the nature of the Dark Pulses, we have a significant dependence on Temperature
- forget-me-not: the Over-voltage is affecting the triggering probability

RANDOM POWER

The essence: turning unpredictable “Dark Pulses” into bits



1. tag & time stamp the occurrences of the random pulses

2. analyse the time series of the pulses:

- bit 1: Δt_{12} vs Δt_{34}
- bit 2: Δt_{23} vs Δt_{45}
- bit 3: Δt_{56} vs Δt_{78}
- bit 4: Δt_{67} vs Δt_{89}

RANDOM POWER

4. the Random Power principle:

This is the essence of

RANDOM POWER

- Italian Patent granted in Sept. 2020
- EU & US patent granted in 2022
- in the examination phase in China, JP, Korea (since April 2021)

A genuine **Q(quantum)-True Random Number Generator,** namely **a Quantum Coin Flipper**

providing virtually endless streams of

RANDOM BITS ➜ CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS

shielded against any bias by the fundamentals of Quantum Mechanics

ARE WE ALONE IN THE UNIVERSE?

	IDQ	RANDOM POWER
History	Established in 2001	Starting-up
Technology floor	QTRNG platform + services	Minimum Viable Product
Complexity	HIGH	LOW
Efficiency	LOW	HIGH
Robustness	LOW	HIGH
Miniaturisation	BIG chip	SMALL chip viable
Cost of the single generator board	1000+ EUR	500 EUR

ID Quantique - https://www.idquantique.com

+ a handful of other players:

Quintessence Labs, Quantum Numbers Corp, KETS, QUSIDE, Qrypt, PicoQuant, MPD

Major advantage of the Random Power technology, fully CMOS compliant, offering the possibility to integrate the device into a custom chip with advanced features

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KETS
QUSIDE
Qrypt, EVERLASTING SECURITY
PicoQuant
MPD, MICRO PHOTON DEVICES

Major advantage of the Random Power technology, fully CMOS compliant, offering the possibility to integrate the device into a custom chip with advanced features

WHERE ARE WE NOW - completed developments

The MINIMUM VIABLE PRODUCT [MVP], the progenitor of a class of Quantum Random Bit Generators:

8 cm

3.5 cm

Qualified according to the NIST standards
(National Institute of Standard & Technology)

Developed thanks to the **seed capital [100 000 €]** granted by

ATTRACT

https://attract-eu.com

which selected Random Power as one of 170 "breakthrough projects" out of 1211 submissions **[May 2019- October 2020]**

RANDOM POWER

WHERE ARE WE NOW

8 cm

3.5 cm

WHERE ARE WE NOW

8 cm

3.5 cm

Single generator (either 1x1 mm2 or 3x3 mm2 - Bit rate for the smaller area device: O(100 kbps) - operated with overvoltage stabilisation against Temperature variations

WHERE ARE WE NOW

8 cm

3.5 cm

Amplification & discrimination

Single generator (either 1x1 mm2 or 3x3 mm2 - Bit rate for the smaller area device: O(100 kbps) - operated with overvoltage stabilisation against Temperature variations

RANDOM POWER

WHERE ARE WE NOW

8 cm

3.5 cm

FPGA embedding a proprietary TDC and implementing the bit extraction + real-time sanity checks (MONOBIT&RUNS) + conditioning function (SHA-256)

Amplification & discrimination

Single generator (either 1x1 mm2 or 3x3 mm2 - Bit rate for the smaller area device: O(100 kbps) - operated with overvoltage stabilisation against Temperature variations

RANDOM POWER

WHERE ARE WE NOW

8 cm

3.5 cm

FTDI chip for data routing on the USB

FPGA embedding a proprietary TDC and implementing the bit extraction + real-time sanity checks (MONOBIT&RUNS) + conditioning function (SHA-256)

Amplification & discrimination

Single generator (either 1x1 mm2 or 3x3 mm2 - Bit rate for the smaller area device: O(100 kbps) - operated with overvoltage stabilisation against Temperature variations

WHERE ARE WE NOW

8 cm

3.5 cm

Upon request, bits can be routed on pins

FTDI chip for data routing on the USB

FPGA embedding a proprietary TDC and implementing the bit extraction + real-time sanity checks (MONOBIT&RUNS) + conditioning function (SHA-256)

Amplification & discrimination

Single generator (either 1x1 mm2 or 3x3 mm2 - Bit rate for the smaller area device: O(100 kbps) - operated with overvoltage stabilisation against Temperature variations

6. state-of-the-art:

finalAnalysisReport_PART2.txt

RESULTS FOR THE UNIFORMITY OF P-VALUES AND THE PROPORTION OF PASSING SEQUENCES

generator is </Users/luca/Documents/Random_Power/ProgramAndTechnical/ATTRACT_Eu_Board_Fw8/TestFW8_4BitNoReshape_1GB_Part2.bin>

C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	P-VALUE	PROPORTION	STATISTICAL TEST
100	110	95	93	90	90	114	101	98	109	0.682823	986/1000	Frequency
97	102	94	103	107	97	105	106	102	87	0.941144	993/1000	BlockFrequency
95	95	101	100	113	106	93	100	89	108	0.842937	989/1000	CumulativeSums
94	112	117	90	93	91	89	96	123	95	0.125927	987/1000	CumulativeSums
100	93	91	112	93	112	99	110	101	89	0.647530	992/1000	Runs
105	91	96	80	121	99	85	100	107	116	0.092597	989/1000	LongestRun
100	104	89	110	97	88	126	84	99	103	0.148653	992/1000	Rank
95	109	103	113	85	94	90	100	106	105	0.630872	995/1000	FFT
104	98	91	89	104	90	110	104	115	95	0.632955	987/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
111	93	112	88	96	95	100	101	106	98	0.798139	981/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
111	100	93	94	101	109	93	87	117	95	0.514124	986/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
86	94	119	101	107	98	93	103	98	101	0.626709	998/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
93	112	93	103	91	89	94	99	115	111	0.498313	989/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
84	106	101	109	86	119	111	96	94	94	0.249284	988/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
114	92	98	96	105	105	101	100	83	106	0.682823	992/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
117	87	98	101	100	106	91	94	105	101	0.697257	991/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
90	93	97	107	99	89	100	116	108	101	0.689019	994/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
99	108	98	99	116	104	98	85	96	97	0.743915	991/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
88	93	103	101	112	94	111	99	100	99	0.829047	988/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
96	97	103	103	106	108	114	97	93	83	0.651693	987/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate
108	95	97	109	84	94	101	101	91	120	0.388990	988/1000	NonOverlappingTemplate

series of tests on non-overlapping templates

80	98	115	100	98	115	107	91	83	113	0.106877	993/1000	OverlappingTemplate
86	116	121	101	91	87	96	101	87	114	0.084037	990/1000	Universal
97	90	107	116	110	95	103	93	92	97	0.668321	987/1000	ApproximateEntropy
70	62	54	60	55	66	60	63	77	65	0.668486	626/632	RandomExcursions
62	69	58	70	58	61	56	71	63	64	0.909311	626/632	RandomExcursions
60	53	59	62	76	72	60	59	66	65	0.681642	620/632	RandomExcursions
70	64	83	45	62	69	70	65	51	53	0.040275	622/632	RandomExcursions
66	69	69	73	73	73	38	49	52	70	0.009611	627/632	RandomExcursions
65	52	67	82	68	54	51	63	72	58	0.136536	627/632	RandomExcursions
61	55	60	72	66	71	67	56	55	69	0.711017	626/632	RandomExcursions
47	61	62	58	71	63	71	61	68	70	0.553450	625/632	RandomExcursions
60	57	66	62	58	61	67	67	73	61	0.941564	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
60	70	43	60	64	58	58	88	64	67	0.030676	622/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
66	58	51	65	51	61	72	72	71	65	0.447593	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
63	67	59	46	67	60	68	70	73	59	0.483876	623/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
61	67	58	69	63	74	48	60	66	66	0.615645	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
75	62	63	58	63	55	66	54	71	65	0.717488	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
68	63	66	54	57	65	63	67	56	73	0.827336	620/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
75	54	64	57	65	64	56	62	64	71	0.733547	623/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
76	68	70	56	55	50	66	52	64	75	0.176734	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
89	63	57	59	59	55	58	68	63	61	0.134074	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
67	68	61	57	60	69	66	63	63	58	0.979797	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
65	64	62	71	58	68	67	53	60	64	0.917568	626/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
71	58	56	62	75	62	67	64	53	64	0.701268	626/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
64	71	49	62	61	69	69	59	59	69	0.694743	626/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
61	65	54	59	63	63	64	76	62	65	0.879806	626/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
58	55	57	67	65	66	54	66	76	68	0.642077	629/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
46	64	65	61	64	61	81	59	75	56	0.150772	624/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
50	56	65	67	74	67	51	63	73	66	0.353061	629/632	RandomExcursionsVariant
106	107	87	107	94	109	100	83	92	115	0.352107	989/1000	Serial
105	100	94	98	96	95	96	101	95	120	0.790621	991/1000	Serial
105	97	89	101	96	106	92	112	105	97	0.875539	991/1000	LinearComplexity

The minimum pass rate for each statistical test with the exception of the random excursion (variant) test is approximately = 980 for a sample size = 1000 binary sequences.

The minimum pass rate for the random excursion (variant) test is approximately = 618 for a sample size = 632 binary sequences.

For further guidelines construct a probability table using the MAPLE program provided in the addendum section of the documentation.

- **A proto-randomness farm based on 10 boards have been collecting about 1.5 Tb, qualified through the NIST and TESTU01 suites.**

Results show that the stream looks extremely "white", essentially with no failures on the raw data beside what can be statistically expected.

- **A SHA256 vetted conditioning function firmware implemented**

- **Two tests have been implemented in firmware to guarantee real-time sanity checks:**

✳ MONOBIT: essentially testing the asymmetries between 0's and 1's in a bit string:

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

✳ RUNS: testing the statistics of the number of sequences of identical bits in a string

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1



RANDOM POWER

WHAT'S NEXT?

on-going developments
&
beyond

BEYOND A PURE TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR (TRNG)

NIST Special Publication 800-90B

Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation

NIST Special Publication 800-90A
Revision 1

Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators

(Second Draft) NIST Special Publication 800-90C

Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions

How to design and test entropy sources to be used to feed Deterministc Random Bit Generators (DRBG)

Approved DRBG mechanisms

Construction of RBG from A+B

- pre-requisites for entering the programs eventually leading to the FIPS-140-3 certification
- impacting on the design of both the ASIC, the multiple generator board and its embodiment in a “system”

GO BEYOND A PURE TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR (TRNG)



- Essentially, the True Random Bits generated by Random Power are used to seed a NIST approved Pseudo Random Bit Generator

- when reseeding occurs after EVERY iteration of the Deterministic machine, you obtain the highest level of security, namely **Prediction Resistance***

* QUOTING NIST: Prediction resistance means that a compromise of the DRBG internal state has no effect on the security of future DRBG outputs.

RANDOM POWER

7. on going developments:

- **design a FIPS-compliant ASIC embedding a SPAD array in standard CMOS technology:**



- **raw bit rate: 1 Mbps**
- **FIPS mode (NIST DRBG): 4096 Bytes in 1050 µs (31.2 Mbps) with prediction resistance**
- **bits delivered in an encrypted stream - expected power: 100 mW**
- **expected to be back from the foundry in Dec. 2023**

- **design a scalable multi-generator system based on an array of SiPM and a LIROC front end ASIC by LIROC**





Table 2 - LIROC main features and performances

Detector Read-Out	SiPM, SiPM array
Number of Channels	64
Signal Polarity	Positive or Negative (selectable ASIC-wise)
Sensitivity	Trigger on 1/3 of photo-electron
Timing Resolution	Better than 20 ps FWHM on single photo-electron Better than 5ns double-peak separation on single photo-electron
Dynamic Range	Over 100MHz photon counting rate
Packaging & Dimension	BGA 20x20 mm2 Flip-Chip low inductance packaging technology

- **raw bit rate: 50 Mbps/board**
- **FIPS mode (NIST DRBG): 32x the raw bit stream**
- **DRBG isolated in the Trusted Execution Environment of a KRIA KR26 System-On-chip**

- **Hw for the 64 generator board delivered in July 2023**

RANDOM POWER

- design a FIPS-compliant ASIC embedding a SPAD array in standard CMOS technology:



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

- v1.0 delivered in July 2023, currently under test

Phase II:

- submission Sept. 20th, 2021
- notification of approval Jan. 31st, 2022
- Duration: May 2022 to August 2024
- funding: 2 MEUR
- selection & competitiveness:

1211 submissions in Phase 1 ➜ 170 approved ➜ 87 submissions for phase II (68 R&D proposals) ➜ 18 R&D approved

Total proposals 87

Proposals received

	TOTAL FUNDING	SUBMITTED PROPOSALS
R&D&I Projects Thematic call	€25M	68
Academy call	€2M	10
Socioeconomic Studies call	€1M	9

combined success rate: 18/1211 = 1.5%, so we did well!

Our consortium:

leading party



18 man-years dedicated to the project

A BIT OF HISTORY



The 2018 Demo Board

2016

The principle at the base of RandomPower emerges, as result of a genuine serendipity event. Initial tests performed with lab equipment

2017

Unpredictability of the generated random bit sequence is assessed using the NIST standards

2018

- A **demo board** is designed, commissioned and qualified;
- Italian patent filing completed (October)
- launch at the CyberSecurity week in Le Hague (October)
- **submission** of the **ATTRACT Phase 1** proposal (October) (100 kEUR)

2019

- **Approval** & **kick-off** of the **ATTRACT Phase 1** proposal (May)
- design, commissioning and production of the single generator board;

2020

- **End** of the **ATTRACT Phase 1** project (October)
- **Full characterisation** of the single generator board
- **winner** of the **Start-Cup competition** (regional level; 20 kEUR)
- **winner** of two special prizes by investors at PNI, start-up competition at **national level**
- **Italian patent granted**

9. last but not least:

2021

- **company establishment** (June)
- first implementation of real-time sanity checks
- **investment (200 kEUR)** by **LifTT**, our VC (June)
- **Submission** of the **ATTRACT Phase 2** proposal (September)

2022

- **approval** of the **ATTRACT Phase 2** proposal (January) (**2 MEUR**)
- **kick-off** of the ATTRACT Phase 2 (May)
- proto-farm commissioned
- implementation of the TESTU01 suite, complementing the NIST test (1.5 Tb qualified)
- **winner** of the Falling Walls venture int'l competition (November)
- **US and EU patent granted**

2023

- real-time sanity check implemented
- design of the multi-gen board completed (April) v1.0
- commissioning of v1.0 started (July) ; qualification expected by December
- **chip submission expected by mid-September**
- **Engineering of the next investment round (including Exploitation agreements)**

2024

- **Chip delivery (February)**
- Chip qualification and packaging (May-June)
- v1.0 of the FIPS compliant sw architecture for the multi-age board
- **FIPS 140-3 certification started**
- **Business plan v2.0**
- **End of the ATTRACT Phase 2 (August?)**
- **Execution of the next investment round**
- **Engineer co-development of applications**
- **GO TO MARKET!**

www.randompower.eu

Established in June 2021

This project has received funding from the ATTRACT project funded by the EC under Grant Agreement 777222

Join us, we will be happy to walk with you!

2020 Winner - ICT

2020 Winner of 2 “special prizes”

2021 PoC investment by LifTT, a VC located in Torino (ITALY)

2022 winner @the Falling Walls venture competition for curious people: here & and there

I AM A FALLING WALLS WINNER

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